In 2026, we won’t see terrorism incidents similar to 9/11, when hijacked airplanes struck the World Trade Center, or the Oklahoma City bombing, when ammonium nitrate–packed trucks leveled federal buildings. Instead, the next act of terror will begin with the buzzing sound of the drone rotors spinning at 5,000 rpm, audible only seconds before the swarm will reach its target.
In recent years, drones have become an integral part of modern warfare. On the battlefield, we’ve undeniably entered the age of precise mass in conflict, where low-cost attributable drones, powered by widely available commercial technology, open software, and AI, are now the most effective weapons. They can be hidden in plain sight and then launched to destroy targets thousands of miles away from active battlefields. In June 2025, for instance, they were used by Ukraine to destroy 10 percent of Russia’s bombers on the tarmac as part of Operation Spider Web. That same month, Israel also launched clandestine drone attacks from within Iran to destroy military and nuclear sites. In April, Houthi rebels used drones and cruise missiles to attack the USS Harry Truman—a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier—in the Red Sea. The carrier swerved so hard to avoid being struck, it tumbled a $56 million F-18 off its deck.
It is certain that in 2026 we will see a drone attack in the United States, against either civilian or military targets.
Like the attacks of 9/11, the surprise will turn out not to be a surprise. The offensive and defensive power of low-cost commercial drones was known by the US military as early as 2017. In that year, Defense Innovation Unit, the Pentagon’s Silicon Valley Office, established the military’s first commercial drone unit, with the support of the then–secretary of defense James Mattis. Named Rogue Squadron, it conducted mock drone fights in parking lots and created the first mass adoption program within the military for commercial drones, called Blue UAS (unmanned aerial system).
Yet today, because of bureaucratic inertia and the accelerating drone capability by foreign adversaries, the US stands defenseless. Currently, no US military installation can reliably repel a complex drone attack like Ukraine’s assault of Russian nuclear bombers. Our civilian infrastructure is even less protected.
Yet the 2025 DoD budget has just $350M for tactical level UAS systems. With this funding, DoD is only expecting to field about 4,000 UASs, bringing the average cost per system close to $100,000. The larger drone factories in Ukraine can produce thousands of “first person viewer” (FPV) drones per day, at a cost of a few hundred dollars a piece. The Ukrainian military delivers to the battlefield 200,000 FPV drones per month and plans to expand production to 4,500,000 FPV drones per year by the end this year.
